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Purpose – This paper examines the nature and function of cost accounting at the Newcastle 
Infirmary, a large voluntary provincial hospital, established in 1751. In particular, the paper 
adds to the literature on accounting within early voluntary hospitals by identifying the 
relative contributions of the costing system to planning and controlling the operations, 
assisting decision-making and holding managers accountable for their performance.  
 
Design/methodology/approach – The paper relies primarily on original documents 
preserved in the archives of the Newcastle Infirmary.  
 
Findings - Although evidence was found of quite sophisticated costing systems, the findings 
suggest that the majority of the information was produced ex post by the hospital 
management to demonstrate good stewardship and to engender financial support. 
 
Research limitations/implications – More cases are needed of other hospitals to ascertain 




Originality/value – Although there are other studies of accounting within British voluntary 
hospitals, and studies of the use of accounting to drive decision-making in profit-making 
organisations during the 19
th
 century, none have investigated the use of accounting as a 
decision-making tool in a voluntary hospital.     
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Introduction 
This paper examines the nature and function of cost accounting used by management 
at the charitable Infirmary for the Sick and Lame Poor of the Counties of Newcastle-upon-
Tyne, Durham, and Northumberland (hereafter the Newcastle Infirmary) c.1840-1888. The 
Newcastle Infirmary was one of many provincial hospitals established throughout Britain 
during the mid-18
th
 and early 19
th
 centuries by contributions from wealthy members of the 
local community, hence their description as “voluntary” hospitals. Voluntary hospitals were 
originally intended for patients who could not afford to pay for their treatment, although there 
were usually severe moral qualifications attached to eligibility which were consistent with 
prevailing Victorian beliefs that the poor were either “deserving” or “undeserving” of help 
(Holden et al., 2009). The voluntary hospitals were established with strict rules to treat only 
the “deserving” poor, those who wanted and were able to work, as opposed to the feckless 
and therefore “undeserving” poor, for whom possibly the best option was the workhouse 
infirmaries. The Statutes and Rules of the Newcastle Infirmary in 1801 stipulated that: 
 
The express design of the Infirmary is to afford relief to the indigent sick, who cannot 
be treated with success at their own homes (TWAS: HO/RVI/74/2). 
     
The population in Newcastle, like many other provincial British cities in the second 
half of the 19
th
 century, expanded rapidly, placing severe pressure on the Newcastle 
Infirmary’s resources. Holden et al. (2009) found that with “employment in the north east of 
England in the 19
th
 century particularly hazardous and serious accidents common, the 
Infirmary quickly became a specialist centre for surgery.” With growing demand for its 
services, and reliance solely on voluntary subscriptions and philanthropic donations, the 
management of the Infirmary had to ensure they managed costs and that decisions were taken 
that would not overstretch the available finances. Hence, the potentially critical importance of 
cost accounts in controlling expenditure and in obtaining value-for-money.  
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However, rather than cost information driving the decision-making activities of the 
Newcastle Infirmary this study establishes that its primary use was to monitor and provide 
justification for decisions already taken. In the case of operating expenses, the paper does 
find cases where the hospital management were able to take reactive decisions over future 
expenditure on the basis of historical cost analyses. The situation was different for capital 
projects. As the paper describes, when considering new extensions such as the Dobson Wing, 
or new medical treatments such as the introduction of antiseptics, accounting was primarily 
visible after the decision had been reached to report the financial impact and benefits 
achieved, rather than before to inform the decision under consideration. Costing information 
at the Newcastle Infirmary was produced first and foremost to demonstrate that the 
management, who were unpaid governors subscribing at least two guineas a year, had 
fulfilled their social obligations to the subscribers and other benefactors in providing effective 
treatment for the “deserving” poor of the region rather than to inform investment decisions. 
As a charitable institution, accounting for costs was used to reinforce this message of moral 
rectitude. For the governors there was a selfish motive too, in that although unpaid, the role 
of governor accorded them significant social status. Hence, anyone occupying these roles 
could not afford to be seen wasting the resources at their disposal. The effect on business 
reputation was another consideration in view of the closely integrated nature of the local 
business community at that time (see Lendrum 2012). 
Evidence has been gathered from the annual reports of the Newcastle Infirmary, 
records analysing income and expenditure kept from the Infirmary’s foundation in 1751, and 
the minutes of the Infirmary’s main committees, the House Committee, Medical Committee, 
and Special Finance Committee, most of which are preserved within the Newcastle 
University Library (NUL) and Tyne and Wear Archive Service (TWAS).  The hospital’s 
statutes and regulations and building reports were also examined. The Newcastle Infirmary 
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kept many volumes of detailed records relating to the workings of its various committees, the 
vast majority of which still survive today. Records relating to the hospital’s success in 
treating patients such as the average length of stay, number of patients treated and death-rates 
were regularly published in the annual reports. In addition, and exceptionally for the time, a 
great deal of costing information was also published in these reports, such as cost per bed and 
cost per patient. The annual reports of a voluntary hospital played a pivotal role in its 
marketing and communicating to current and potential subscribers, as well as to other 
voluntary hospitals. However, there were no statutory requirements regarding what should or 
should not be published in these reports. As a result, the annual reports were used as a means 
of conveying the prior year’s performance as well as highlighting future issues and plans, all 
of which potentially could have significant financial implications for the subscribers and 
other benefactors. From its very beginnings, the books of account of the Infirmary were to 
“lie constantly open for inspection” (1751 Annual Report). As a result, anyone including non-
subscribers could access the accounting records if desired.  
The paper continues by firstly identifying recent contributions to understanding the 
role of accounting in hospitals and the absence of a strong costing culture in early hospitals 
despite the advanced state of cost accounting many 19
th
 century industries.  An overview is 
then presented of the funding arrangements of the Newcastle Infirmary, its management 
structure and lines of reporting, before turning to the cost accounts themselves which are 
considered under two key headings: operational costing and capital projects. The operational 
costing used in the day-to-day management of the Infirmary is examined by investigating the 
accounting records kept, the controls in place and the key performance indicators being 
published. The large capital projects undertaken during the period are then scrutinised to 
determine the degree to which financial considerations influenced these decisions and, thus, 
the nature of the accounting information used. In this respect, the extent to which costing 
  6 
information was produced and used ex ante as opposed to ex post is particularly relevant. By 
definition, ex ante information would have been available to inform the investment decision 
under review as it would have been prepared before the event, in contrast to information 
relating to the project produced ex post that would not have been accessible until afterwards. 
 
Hospitals and the rise of cost accounting   
Hospitals in the modern era have attracted the attention of accounting researchers not 
only because of the vast resources that they consume but, possibly more importantly, they 
present the most challenging problems for government when evaluating performance (Birch 
and Maynard 2006).  Unlike many public and private sector services, for example the 
building and management of roads, hospitals involve the provision of services that have the 
greatest impact on the well-being of large numbers of the population and, therefore, the 
source of greatest political exposure to governments should services not be delivered 
efficiently and effectively.  While the public might recognise that matters of finance must be 
major considerations when managing hospitals, rarely are they prepared to prioritise finance 
ahead of the alleviation of suffering. A significant part of the efforts of critical accounting 
researchers with a public sector emphasis has been directed at the National Health Service 
(NHS) and the management of its hospitals (Broadbent et al 1991; Laughlin and Broadbent 
1996; Froud and Shaoul 2001; Broadbent and Laughlin 2002; Broadbent et al 2003). Critical 
accounting researchers have been especially prominent in their examination of the ways in 
which accounting, and the managerial values and emphases that it promotes, has been used in 
the public sector as a key element of the New Public Management (NPM) to supplant 
previous administrative understandings of accounting and performance measures. Critical 
accounting scholars have exposed, across myriad government agencies and services, how 
accounting has been essential in the institutionalisation of a new regime of public sector 
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values, most especially those which result in measurable, auditable and reportable 
performance, and the social consequences of these changes (Power 1997; Funnell et al 2009).  
However, the idea of holding hospital managers to account by measuring performance 




 centuries. Indeed, this was one of the main drivers behind 
the costing records at the Newcastle Infirmary in the mid-to-late-19
th
 century. While there 
have been many histories of British hospitals (for example see Anning 1963; Eade 1900; 
Haliburton-Hume 1906; Hall et al 1987; Harris 1922; Jacob 1951; Robb-Smith 1970), studies 
of the history of accounting in hospitals have been very limited (see for example Cherry 
1972,1980,1992,1996; Jones and Mellett 2007; Berry 1997). Robson (2003, 2006) examined 
the development of departmental accounting and the spread of uniform accounts within 
voluntary hospitals at the turn of the 20
th
 century. Most recently Jackson (2012) has focused 
on how the Edinburgh Royal Infirmary used their annual accounts to raise subscriptions by 
listing subscribers not alphabetically but geographically, thereby allowing each contributor to 
examine his own contribution against that of his neighbour. Most importantly, placing this 
information in the public domain also exposed to public disapprobation those subscribers 
who had not honoured their commitment and were in arrears.  
The present paper compliments a previous study of the Newcastle Infirmary that 
examined the hospital’s external accounting arrangements in the same period (Holden et al., 
2009).  Whereas the concern of the present study is the extent to which the accounting 
practices of the Infirmary were used to plan and control the operations and aid decisions, the 
earlier study examined how the deployment of accounting information either reflected or 
challenged pervading social beliefs relating to the poor. It identified how those managing the 
Infirmary used the annual reports as a tool to echo and reinforce the pervading moral attitudes 
of the day. Most especially, the annual reports emphasised “self-help”, or the need to restore 
to health those who were capable of working, as the qualification for assistance in order to 
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raise the necessary money from subscribers and benefactors. At the same time, the reports 
were unexpectedly found to have challenged these self-same social and moral beliefs to 
enable the hospital to fulfil its religious and humanitarian mission of providing assistance to 
the poor as a whole, the so-called “deserving” and “undeserving” alike.  
The current study augments our knowledge of the contribution of accounting to 




 centuries, and in particular as an aid 
to management decision-making, by broadening the focus of interest from the industrial firms 
that have preoccupied accounting historians to the not-for-profit sector. During this period, 
commercial organisations, particularly those in capital intensive industries such as iron and 
steel or engineering, were developing costing systems to better understand the determinants 
of profit, the allocation of overheads and the key factors in decision-making. Jones (1985, pp. 
168-171), for example, demonstrated that the Mona Mine Company was using an imputed 
interest charge to take account of the opportunity cost of the working capital when 
determining the profitability of a particular activity as early as 1800. By 1870 a relatively 
sophisticated form of overhead apportionment based on a level of throughput was in 
operation at the Staveley Colliery (Boyns and Edwards 1997). Standards were being used by 
Boulton & Watt for control and planning decisions including setting piece-rates by 1800 
(Fleischman et al., 1995), and to judge the efficiency of coal consumption in a copper 
smelting company, Vivian & Sons at Hafod in the 1840s (Edwards and Newell, 1991). 
Costing was employed to determine selling price at the Wedgwood Company (Fleischman 
and Tyson 1993). Jones (1985, pp. 110-111) found evidence of budgeting in the Dowlais Iron 
Company in the early 19
th
 century where accounting also informed the strategic decision-
making process during the 1850s and 1860s (Boyns and Edwards 1997).  
Based on an appraisal of some two hundred industrial enterprises mainly in the iron, 
textiles and coal sectors Fleischman and Parker (1997, p. 47) concluded that “the 
  9 
comprehensiveness and variety of cost management practices during the British Industrial 
Revolution attest to their high priority with industrial entrepreneurs”. In particular, 
industrialists used cost accounting “to aid them in decisions involving the procuring, tracking, 
and comparing of their technological investments” (pp. 234-5). Boyns and Edwards (2013, p. 
279) saw the industrial revolution as a period of continuing evolution in which businessmen 
devised practical costing solutions to provide them with the information they needed “for 
both routine issues, such as price fixing, contract tendering and monitoring/control purposes, 
as well as for more strategic decision making purposes”. Despite the consistency of these 
studies regarding the significance of costing to decision-making in the industrial revolution, 
dissenting voices remain over how effective an aid it proved in practice, and indeed whether 
the costing calculations that have been interpreted by historians as designed to aid decisions 
were really intended to serve that purpose by the owners (Fleischman and Parker, 1997, p. 8; 
Miller and Napier 1993; Hoskin and Macve 2000). Bryer (2005), for example, argues that the 
Economic Rationalist School is mistaken to attribute decision-usefulness as a motive to cost 
accounts in this era when their true purpose was to align the mentality of the managers with 
that of the owners by providing the means by which the managers could be held accountable. 
This particular issue is relevant to the Newcastle Infirmary where accountability was the 
prime motivator of the costing procedures rather than decision-making. 
 
Funding and managing the Newcastle Infirmary 
The revenue of voluntary hospitals came predominately from annual subscriptions 
made by socially prominent, wealthy members of the community as well as by employers, 
trade unions and town councils (McCord 1974, p.97; Woodward 1974, p.38).  The 
subscription income was supplemented by legacies and bequests, one-off donations, interest 
on investments, poor-box donations and special fund-raising events such as dinners, sermons, 
  10 
benefit plays and concerts. During the period under review each subscription of one guinea to 
the Newcastle Infirmary entitled the subscriber to recommend one outpatient per year for 
treatment and two guineas provided for two outpatients or one inpatient per year. For any 
amount subscribed over two guineas, these ratios remained constant (NUL, Hospital 
Archives, 72 - Annual Report 1850, p.27; Annual Report 1867, p.3; NUL, Hospital Archives, 
45 -Statutes and Rules 1855). Patients seeking to be admitted to the hospital would present a 
letter of introduction, obtained from a subscriber, to the House Committee. This helped to 
ensure that only eligible “objects” of the charity, the indigent poor were considered for 
admission to the Infirmary. Towards the end of the 19th century this letter system of 
admittance was abandoned by voluntary hospitals to be replaced by a free for all system, 
funded by small weekly worker subscriptions in addition to the existing large annual 
subscriptions made by the social elite and corporations. The Newcastle Infirmary itself 
became free to all in 1888. At the same time, the Infirmary was exposed to significant 
changes in both medical practice and local demographics that were to place ever greater 
demands on its facilities, services provided and management system. 
The latter decades of the 19
th
 century saw considerable improvements in medical 
treatment with the introduction of anaesthetics, antiseptics and Florence Nightingale’s 
revolutionary advances in nursing care. Anaesthetics and antiseptics enabled more operations 
to be undertaken and forced the Infirmary to consider increased staffing levels to cope with 
the increased demand. The cost of surgical instruments and chemicals, such as ether, 
chloroform and carbolic acid also rose. As a result, there was a significant change in the type 
of costs incurred by the Infirmary during this period. Prior to the introduction of anaesthetics 
and antiseptics, the major costs were victuals. Innovative patient care placed additional 
strains on the Infirmary’s capacity to treat those in need. In 1859 Florence Nightingale 
published her Notes on Nursing: What Nursing is and What Nursing is Not, which sold over 
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15,000 copies in the first two months (Lane 2009). Its teachings on ventilation, light, patient 
diet, overcrowding and the use of professionally trained nurses, as opposed to patients 
nursing other patients, all had financial implications if they were to be introduced by the 
Infirmary. In addition, the City of Newcastle was a thriving port and industrial hub, attracting 
migrant and immigrant workers with the prospect of work in the booming industries of 
shipbuilding, coal, iron and steel, railways, engineering, armaments and chemicals. This 
influx of workers created a large increase in the population of the city with the result that 
sanitary conditions failed to keep pace with the growing populace resulting in outbreaks of 
cholera, most notably in 1848 and 1853. These developments were to have major 
implications for the services demanded from the Newcastle Infirmary and how it was to be 
managed. 
While each infirmary throughout Britain in the 19th century had its own rules and 
regulations, management practices and principles were remarkably similar. This reflected the 
preparedness of voluntary hospitals throughout England and Wales to share their experiences 
and knowledge (see Berry 1997, p.2). Anning (1963, p.56), for example, has shown how the 
Leeds Infirmary borrowed its manual of regulations from the Manchester Infirmary. Later, a 
deputation of the Building Committee from the Newcastle Infirmary was sent in 1852 to visit 
other hospitals to ascertain good practice ahead of drawing up plans for the construction of a 
new building, the Dobson Wing. The tour of inspection covered Manchester, Liverpool, 
Birmingham, and London. In addition the architect “inspected and made a plan of the new 
hospital in Brussels” (NUL, Hospital Archives, 72, Deputation Report, 1852). All underlying 
principles of governance, management and day-to-day operation of the Newcastle Infirmary 
were set out in the Statutes and Rules of the Infirmary. First set down in 1751, these were not 
changed until 1801 and thereafter updated more regularly. The 1801 Statutes and Rules 
(Section 3, page 15) emphasised that: 
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There must be a regular system of management. And this must depend upon the 
personal attention of the governors to the general interests of the charity. This will be 
found necessary, not only to check every irregularity in the patients, and to animate 
the exertion of every department; but also to prevent the funds from being 
improvidently wasted. Individuals, nay all the stated officers of the house, may 
perform their respective duties, yet as a whole the charity will not produce its full 
effects without a respectable attendance at the quarterly courts, a proper attention of 
the weekly visitors, and the constant exertions of a vigilant and active committee. 
(NUL, Hospital Archives, 43) 
 
This “regular system of management” was provided by the Board of Governors and 
delegated to the House Committee and from there to the staff, most notably the House 
Surgeon, Matron, Secretary and Treasurer. The Governors, as prominent financiers of the 
Infirmary, would be invited and encouraged to attend the quarterly courts, the main forum at 
which the operation and needs of the Infirmary were discussed, as well as to become 
members of specific committees. They were also expected to take their turn as a weekly 
visitor, walking the wards and reporting any concerns to the weekly meeting of the House 
Committee. The quarterly courts allowed the Governors the opportunity to “receive the 
reports of the House Committee, to inspect the accounts, and to transact such other business 
as shall be brought before the Court” (NUL, Hospital Archives, 72, Annual Report 1867, p. 4; 
Statutes, Rules and Orders 1751, p. 3). During the period under review, the House Committee 
consisted of 12 Governors, which met every week to manage the operational issues regarding 
admittance and discharge of patients; hiring and discipline of staff; receiving and acting upon 
the verbal reports of the weekly Visitors; recording income and chasing late payment. The 
House Committee was also responsible for overseeing the recording and approval of 
expenses. As charities, voluntary hospitals were expected to keep accurate and detailed 
accounts to allow their stewardship to be vouchsafed. At each quarterly court the Treasurer 
was to give a report on the level of subscriptions, legacies, benefactions and any other sums 
received in the quarter (TWAS, HO/RVI/74/2 - Statutes and Rules 1801, Rules for the 
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Treasurer). Throughout the period of study the Infirmary employed a Secretary assisted by a 
Treasurer. The latter was to be a Governor performing his duty in an unpaid capacity. The 
Secretary was responsible for maintaining accounts until 1883, when it devolved to an 




The House Surgeon was required to enter the wards every morning to enquire as to 
the state of health of the patients, to provide and prepare drugs and chemical preparations as 
directed by the physicians and note any effect they had on the patients. In effect the House 
Surgeon was an administrative apothecary. He was a paid resident in contrast to the unpaid 
honorary physicians. The efficacy of treatment was reported back to the physicians while an 
account of the expense of the drugs and chemical preparations was delivered to the House 
Committee. In addition, the House Surgeon was required to report to the House Committee 
on the first Thursday of every month the names of all patients who had been in the house for 
more than two months. Any stay longer than two months was regarded as prima facie 
indication that the patient had been wrongly admitted and, in addition, was probably unlikely 
to be restored to health.  
The Matron was responsible for the care of all household goods and furniture, the 
quality and quantity of provisions, the cleanliness of the wards and the conduct of the nurses 
and servants. She was required to keep a daily account of all provisions and necessaries used 
and to provide this account to the House Committee at its regular Thursday meetings (see for 
example Rules to be Observed by the Matron, Statutes, Rules and Orders 1751). In particular, 
Rule 64 of the 1801 Statutes and Rules stated that: 
 
                                                 
1
 The Infirmary first employed an accountant in 1859, but given his salary was only £10 compared to £42 for the 
Secretary (1860 Annual Report) it would seem that the accountant at first worked in a part-time manner for the 
Infirmary. 
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She shall carefully superintend the management of the infirmary in every particular in 
her department and see that it be conducted with the greatest regularity and economy. 
(TWAS, HO/RVI/74/2) 
 
Statute XXI, introduced in 1801, required a committee of three governors, appointed 
at the quarterly court in April, to draw up the annual report of the Infirmary which was to 
include an “abstract of the accounts”.  No further details are given as to what this abstract 
should contain, although the early 19
th
 century ones consist of a rudimentary income and 
expense account. The requirement of the House Surgeon and Matron to report the 
expenditure on drugs, provisions and other necessaries and for the Treasurer to report income 
provided the information needed to prepare these basic financial statements. By the mid-19
th
 
century there was more analysis of larger items of expenditure but essentially little had 
changed. Not until the end of the 19
th 
century did the accounts include a balance sheet as well 
as a version of Sir Henry Burdett’s “uniform system of accounts - 1893”.2 
Annual reports traditionally had four main sections: the annual accounts and report on 
performance; an appeal for funding; a list of subscribers not in arrears with the amounts paid; 
and the types and numbers of patients treated and their outcomes (Berry 1997, p.4). Figure 1 




INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE 
________________________________________ 
 
                                                 
2 The uniform system of accounts was devised by Sir Henry Burdett and adopted by many voluntary hospitals 
from 1893 onwards. It formalised the presentation of accounting information to allow easy comparison to be 
made between institutions. Some of the larger charities, such as the Sunday Fund, King’s Fund and Saturday 
Fund, insisted that hospitals adopt the system as a precondition for grant applications.  
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As can be seen from Figure 1, expenditure was listed and totalled under summary 
headings. During the first 100 years of operation the number of categories of expenditure 
increased gradually from 20 to the mid-30s by 1850. There are 35 in Figure 1. Thereafter, the 
numbers accelerated with over 50 categories of expenditure included in the 1880’s, reflecting 
the expansion in the scope of the hospital’s activities occurring during the timeframe of this 
study. It is also evident from the inclusion of one-and-a-half years’ salary for the matron in 
Figure 1 that the accounts were prepared on a cash rather than accruals basis.  
Whilst it was a rule of the institution that “no person should take any fee, reward or 
gratuity directly or indirectly for any service done” (Statutes and Rules 1801), the resident 
staff, that is House Surgeon, nurses and general servants, were excluded from this rule. As 
the scale of the management task increased with the expansion of the Infirmary’s capacity, 
the number of paid senior officers also increased, some of whom were employed on a full-
time basis. The most notable case in the period of study is Mr R. R. Redmayne who was 
appointed at an annual salary of £300 as “House Governor” in 1883. He had supreme 
authority in the Infirmary. All paid officers reported to him and he was responsible for all 
aspects of the Infirmary, reporting to the quarterly Board of Governors. 
For much of the 19
th
 century it was unusual for doctors and physicians in voluntary 
hospitals to have any significant role in decision-making. In 1873 The Lancet warned that by 
concentrating financial control and hospital administration in the same non-medical hands, 
and excluding doctors from management, “expenditure was screwed down in the wrong place 
at the wrong time” (quoted in Rivett 1986, p.14). However, as doctors attending patients in 
voluntary hospitals began to charge for services and as teaching became increasingly 
important to the prestige and success of hospitals, doctors began to be allowed a greater say 
in the financial and clinical management of hospitals (Harris 2004, p.96; Berridge 1990, pp. 
206, 208). The Newcastle Infirmary became very prestigious in the latter half of the 19
th
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century both as a teaching hospital and as a place of surgical excellence, having pioneered the 
use of chloroform and other anaesthetics in operations. After some delay, in the early 1860s a 
Medical Committee at Newcastle evolved under the chair of the House Surgeon and reported 
to the House Committee. Although there had always been a Medical Board composed mostly 
of doctors who worked in an honorary capacity, it was not until the latter half of the 19
th
 
century that the demand for medical services required a committee to manage a significant 
number of full time medical staff. The formation of a Medical Committee had also been 
prompted, in part, by the Medical Act of 1858 which had introduced more formalised 
requirements for medical training and supervision. Also at this time dramatic improvements 
in anaesthetics and understanding of antiseptics which allowed greater success in a wider 
range of medical interventions had contributed to a marked rise in the demand for medical 
services and staff which were now appointed as paid employees of the Infirmary.  
 
Operational costing 
By the very nature of the services provided by hospitals, the range of conditions, their 
susceptibility to treatment and the treatments on offer, it is easier to pronounce upon 
economy than to assess the effectiveness of hospital management. At the Newcastle 
Infirmary managerial effectiveness was assessed in two ways. The first criterion was the 
number of patients restored to health and useful employment, consistent with the hospital’s 
express mission since its inception of affording relief to the indigent sick. Measures in the 
annual reports such as the number of patients treated, the number of operations, and the 
death-rate served this purpose. Another essential role the management played was to ensure 
the financial survival of the institution. Unlike today where a hospital or health authority can 
potentially be bailed out by additional finance from central government, no such facility 
existed for the voluntary hospitals.  The managers of the Newcastle Infirmary were acutely 
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aware that the finance of the hospital was provided by the local population to service the 
wishes of the local population and, accordingly, they had to be seen not to be squandering the 
limited resources at their disposal. As detailed below, operational cost controls were in place 
at the Infirmary during the period under review to achieve this purpose.  
From the earliest days, but more especially from the early 19
th
 century, there was a 
good understanding at the Newcastle Infirmary about the calculation of the cost of delivering 
particular services. The high cost consciousness of the organisation is evident in the inclusion 
in the 1853 Annual Report of comparative cost analyses stretching back over the first 100 
years of operation, which was updated in subsequent reports. Two of the reports in the series, 
the one analysing cost per patient and the other annual receipts are included in Figures 2 and 
3. The fact that the Infirmary was able to construct these reports indicates that costing records 
were kept from the very beginning.  
 
________________________________________ 
INSERT FIGURES 2 & 3 ABOUT HERE 
________________________________________ 
 
The level of understanding at the Newcastle Infirmary about its costs is reflected in 
the detailed nature of the ex post rationalisation of costs that was included each year in the 
narrative sections of the annual reports. These consistently reveal the hospital actively 
seeking ways to reduce costs, but without impeding its ability to treat patients. In 1878, for 
example, it was reported that the hospital had achieved reductions in the cost of victuals 
through establishing central control over the distribution of meals to the patients (NUL, 
Hospital Archives, 72 – 1878 Annual Report). Comparisons were also regularly made 
between the increase in expenditure and the increase in the number of patients to determine 
  18 
whether the costs per patient were rising disproportionately.  The annual publication of the 
cost per inpatient (see Figure 2 above) highlighted the on-going financial plight of the 
Infirmary and allowed the Board of Governors to demonstrate that the cost of inpatients had 
always been higher than the annual subscriptions. However, there is no evidence to suggest 
that management were trying to keep this figure within a tolerable range. It is true that the 
relaxation of the admission rules during the period identified by Holden et al (2009) would 
have had the effect of lowering the cost per inpatient ratio if the Infirmary had also cut costs.  
Instead, costs were rarely cut at the expense of patient-care, and indeed regular expansion and 
the introduction of new medical techniques generally increased the on-going costs of the 
institution. As a result, the production of the cost per inpatient was unlikely to have been for 
the purposes of reducing or controlling costs, but to highlight the funding deficit and the need 
for greater donations.  
To arrive at the cost per patient, the Infirmary had to deal with the problem of 
overhead allocation. In this, as in other areas, the House Committee took note of what other 
hospitals were doing. This is acknowledged in the 1853 Annual Report, where the Treasurer, 
betraying a sophisticated understanding of costing, explained how the calculation of average 
cost per patient had been arrived at:  
 
It assumed that the whole cost is chargeable to the in-patients, except the drugs and 
surgical instruments, which are divided equally amongst all patients, both in and out. 
The average cost of the out-patients for drugs, is probably not in fact quite so much as 
that of the inpatients; but as to set against this may be considered that a part of the 
House Surgeon and Dispenser’s Salary should be apportioned to them, the calculation 
is probably as near an approximation to the fact as the case admits. In confirmation of 
this view, the Committee (of Governors) observe that the same rule of apportionment 
has been adopted at other Hospitals [emphasis added] (NUL, Hospital Archives, 72). 
 
The costing system employed by the hospital was capable of calculating the 
maximum capacity of inpatients that could be housed given the available finances. This was 
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demonstrated at the weekly House Committee meeting on 26
th
 April 1860 when the following 
notice was ordered to be placed in the local newspaper: 
 
The House Committee of the Infirmary feel it their duty to call the attention of the 
Governors to the present pressure upon the Institution. The average number of 
patients the funds are capable of supporting at one time is not more than 165 whereas 
in the past week the number has been as high as 213. Governors are therefore 
requested to be particularly careful at the present time in not giving letters [of 
admittance] except in cases of extreme urgency as the Committee can not consistently 
with ordinary prudence continue to admit a number so much in excess of the means of 
the charity (TWAS, HO/RVI/2/22). 
 
 
It is noteworthy that it is the funds that are identified as the limiting factor rather 
than the physical capacity of the Infirmary. It was common practice at the hospital to utilise 
all available space to house patients needing treatment, including the sharing of beds. Few in 
need of treatment were denied due to capacity constraints. 
The scope and sophistication of the hospital’s record-keeping are apparent from the 
1878 Annual Report which contained extensive schedules analysing: the numbers of 
inpatients and outpatients treated; the number of patients treated who had suffered serious 
injury from accidents; the number cured or “relieved”; the average cost of the inpatients; the 
average daily number of patients; the average length of stay of the inpatients; the number of 
deaths and the death-rate. Prior year comparatives and 12-year average were given for all 
these figures (NUL, Hospital Archives, 72).  
The importance of the death-rates and average length of stay as key performance 
indicators is again illustrated by the 1878 Annual Report. This revealed that the introduction 
of antiseptics at considerable cost three years previously had not produced the anticipated fall 
in the number of deaths to justify the costs:    
 
The improved dieting, the increase of the nursing staff, the introduction of the 
antiseptic system, all of which have greatly increased the cost of the Institution, have 
not greatly tended to save life or quicken the process of care (NUL, Hospital 
Archives, 72). 
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The report went on to compare the current year with 1863 in terms of cost per 
patient, death rate and average stay in hospital. Only the average stay was comparable. The 
other measures had deteriorated. It was with relief that the governors were able to report the 
following year that the antiseptics were at last having their desired effect and that the death-
rate was now the lowest since 1860. The revolutionary antiseptic system where carbolic acid 
was applied to wounds, following the work of Joseph Lister,
3
 was quickly introduced in all 
surgical hospitals, thereby greatly reducing the death-rate after operations. Innovations such 
as this recognised that cost was not the main driving factor in their implementation. There is, 
for instance, no evidence that the cost of carbolic acid was compared to the cost of linseed, 
the previous treatment at the Infirmary. What is particularly interesting in this case, apart 
from the fact that the new antiseptics were a disappointment, is that the management were 
clearly unconcerned about giving information on a decision that at the time had increased 
costs without any resulting benefit. Thus, the excerpt from the 1878 Annual Report provides 
a compelling example of the ex post use of cost information by the hospital management 
because it illustrates that cost reduction was not their chief priority, but a reduction in the 
death-rate of patients. Other comments in the annual reports support that view. For example, 
the 1879 report pronounced that “in times of mercantile depression, retrenchment is 
necessary in most quarters, but many sacrifices ought to be endured rather than allow the 
Infirmary to suffer”. The point here was that spending should continue despite the economic 
downturn. The 1880 report cited the case of a patient with a compound fracture of the arm 
who had been kept in hospital for 27 weeks in order to save the limb, and had therefore 
exceeded the hospital’s permissible length of stay under its own rules by 4 months. The 
report went on to state that had the arm been amputated – the most cost-effective option – she 
                                                 
3
 Joseph Lister was a Fellow of the Royal College of Surgeons of Edinburgh and later a surgeon at the Royal 
Glasgow Infirmary, and pioneered the use of carbolic acid in the 1860’s to clean wounds during and following 
surgery. For this reason Lister is often known as the “father of modern surgery” 
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might have been discharged in 4 or 5 weeks. Considering that the annual reports were the 
main medium by which the management were held accountable by the hospital’s financial 
supporters, the publication of these extracts placing patient-care above cost, suggests they 
shared this view. 
Then, as is now common in hospitals, there was tension between the medical staff on 
the Medical Committee and the administrators, the House Committee. On one occasion the 
Medical Committee minutes of 30 December 1865 refer to a request by the House Committee 
to reduce milk in the diet of patients following a price rise resulting from a cattle plague that 
had reduced supply (TWAS, HO/RVI/22/1). The Medical Committee refused this request, 
insisting on strict adherence to the milk diet.  Similarly, in 1876 the House Committee noted 
the increasing cost of wine, spirits and fermented liquors given to patients. The House 
Committee asked for the prescription of such liquors to be kept within moderate bounds for 
“moral and financial reasons”. The Medical Committee again refused the request, prompting 
the House Committee to require a report on the types and quantities of liquors consumed and 
the class of patients treated. Prior to this, the expenditure on liquor was £120 8s 2d in the first 
quarter of 1876, and in the second quarter £123 9s 3d. It subsequently fell to £56 3s 9d in the 
third quarter and £38 3s in the fourth quarter (NUL, Hospital Archives, 72, 1876 Annual 
Report). Although the Medical Committee had at first refused the House Committee’s 
request, they clearly reacted to it once they realised that the expenditure would be subject to 
greater scrutiny by the governors in future.  
It was not always the House Committee making requests to the Medical Committee. 
For example, on 25 March 1868 the Medical Committee resolved to lay before the House 
Committee an appeal for an increase in the number of nurses, if the funds of the hospital 
would allow, following a complaint by the surgical staff that the surgical wards were 
understaffed. The request was refused on this occasion, despite there being fewer than 15 
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nurses in the Infirmary to look after an average daily number of patients in excess of 175. 
Although the House Committee was responsible for the recruitment and selection of resident 
staff, it delegated its authority to the House Surgeon and Matron at times of crisis where 
speed of action was vital. This can be seen from the following extract from the House 
Committee minutes of 15 September 1853: 
 
In consequence of additional labour caused by great number of persons frequenting 
the Infirmary for relief of diarrhoea and cholera, the House Surgeon be empowered to 
procure such additional assistants as he thinks necessary from time to time: and 
matron also be empowered to provide whatever may be necessary for the comfort of 
any person affected with the disorders (TWAS, HO/RVI/2/20). 
 
Despite the obvious and potentially significant financial implications of this 
decision, the Infirmary archives contain no evidence to suggest that the cost implications 
were considered. The overriding impression from the hospital minutes is that whilst cost was 
taken extremely seriously, and kept to a minimum where possible, it was not ultimately 
allowed to outweigh patient needs.  
It is nonetheless clear from the House Committee minutes that the Infirmary kept a 
close eye on costs from its foundation. Contained within the minutes of each quarterly court 
was the statement: “The following notes being examined by the auditors and found right were 
passed by the committee and ordered to be paid.” There then followed a list of classes of 
expenditure and amounts. In later years, but especially from the 1820’s onwards, these types 
of expenditure were split between headings such as victuals, liquors, drugs, repairs, malt and 
stationery, which were in turn used to produce a quarterly analysed cash book. The paper has 
already commented on the internal channels through which costs were reported to the House 
Committee and quarterly courts of governors. In addition, the minutes of the House 
Committee from the 1820’s onwards show that every quarter suppliers were asked to tender 
for items such as meat, flour, malt and hops. Invariably the cheapest quote was chosen 
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although the minutes indicate that the quality of the products was also an issue. Thus, 
tendering constituted alternative means of cost control, this time not involving the production 
of accounts.  
In 1887 a Special Committee produced a major report on the past management and 
financial position of the Infirmary (TWAS, HO/RVI/70). The report examined the types of 
patients as well as the major areas of expenditure and then made recommendations. Not 
surprisingly, a prominent inclusion in the report was the number of patients admitted in 
breach of hospital rules. The key recommendation was the abolition of the letter system to 
make the Infirmary a hospital free to all. Other recommendations included the abandoning of 
the House and Medical Committees in favour of one combined Committee and opening 
wards for patients who contributed towards their own maintenance. What was being 
advocated was effectively a form of early private care in hospitals. Although this particular 
recommendation was not implemented, the fact that the Committee now considered that 
wealthy individuals would choose to be treated at the Infirmary, rather than at home, shows 
how far the hospital had progressed in the facilities and services on offer. From a costing 
perspective, the Special Committee also recommended adopting the method of keeping 
accounts used by the Edinburgh Infirmary, which recorded expenditure on patients according 
to member of staff. This last recommendation shows an advanced application of costing, as 
each doctor would effectively become a cost centre and, as such, their actions and the 
financial consequences thereof be more visible.  
There are two related reasons why the hospital management were anxious to track and 
analyse operating costs. First, there was the need to control expenditure in order to safeguard 
the activities given that its regular income from subscriptions was limited. The internal 
disputes over expenditure on milk and liquor referred to above are examples of the House 
Committee monitoring the level of spending on provisions and taking reactive decisions to 
  24 
reduce it wherever possible. Concern over the hospital’s ability to meet its expenses stemmed 
from its charitable status which made it dependent on voluntary contributions for its survival. 
Secondly, detailed recording and analysing of costs played an additional and crucial role in 
securing the continued financial support of the local community by highlighting the high cost 
of the services provided and by demonstrating that the hospital management were providing 
good value for the moneys donated. It is in this light that the ex post rationalisation of the 
operating costs in the narrative sections of the annual reports should be interpreted, as well as 
the various published key-performance indicators, such as death-rate and cost per patient. 
These were the criteria by which the management were held accountable. Their success in 
garnering affirmation from their peers is evident from the level of financial support received. 
In none of the years in question did the Infirmary fall into deficit (Holden et al, 2009), 
notwithstanding the expansion in the number of patients and range of treatments on offer. 
By the end of the period under review controlling costs was ever more vital to the 
Infirmary owing to the expansion of its activities and the financial pressure that this created. 
Despite the uncertainty expressed initially over the benefits of the new antiseptic system, its 
arrival eventually played a dramatic role in improving death-rates, whilst at the same time 
greatly increasing costs. The success of the antiseptic system coupled with the use of 
anaesthetics gave the surgeons the confidence to perform operations previously they would 
not have considered possible. As more people survived the aftermath of surgery, more 
operations were performed. Whereas in 1876 the total inpatients for the year was 1,630 and 
there were 297 operations performed, only eight years later in 1884 the figures had reached 
2,578 inpatients and 908 operations. This large increase in numbers of both inpatients and 
operations together with the resulting increases in annual expenditure rendered the existing 
funding arrangements untenable. As noted above, the system changed completely in 1888. 
Major investment in capital was also needed to cope with the increasing demands, 
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culminating in the building of a new hospital in 1906, the Royal Victoria Infirmary. A 
number of these capital projects were undertaken in the period of study, and the question 




Throughout the life of the Infirmary, the House Committee showed little hesitation 
in regularly committing itself to heavy expenditure on improvements and new facilities, 
including: the new Dobson Wing (1855); a Turkish air bath (1860); the purchase of land 
adjacent to the hospital for the exercise of convalescent patients, and to prevent others 
building on it (1863); new flooring and fire escapes (1867); a hydraulic lift (1876); new 
operating theatre and associated ward (1878); refitting the kitchens and dispensary, new 
drains, floors and cooking range, improving lighting and ventilation (1880); and the 
temporary Ravensworth Wards (1885). Despite the often significant sums involved in these 
building improvements and additions, there is no evidence that accounting provided more 
than a minor contribution to investment decisions when judged from an economic as opposed 
to social perspective. What mattered most was enhancing the Infirmary’s ability to meet the 
medical needs of the local community. Need was the overriding determinant of investment 
decisions, not funds currently available. Indeed, decisions were taken by the hospital 
governors to invest heavily in capital improvements before funding had been secured. These 
were essentially leaps of faith in that they relied upon the continued generosity of the 
benefactors, who on numerous occasions since the foundation of the Infirmary in 1751 had 
provided the necessary funds. This is clearly illustrated by the following extract from the 
1853 Annual Report: 
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When, a hundred years ago, the Infirmary was founded, the subscriptions were on so 
liberal a scale as to leave the Institution at the end of the first ten years in possession 
of a capital of £7,000, and that, too, after defraying the cost of the original building. 
Again, fifty years ago, when the first new wing was built, we find that the annual 
subscriptions and other contributions received an immediate increase of nearly one 
half. The Committee, therefore, indulge a confident hope that the present age will not 




Fortunately for Newcastle and its environs, the confidence in the generosity of the 
hospital’s benefactors was time-and-again borne out in practice. For example, the pre-
eminent northern industrialist, armaments manufacturer and philanthropist William 
Armstrong covered the entire cost of major improvements in 1870 (TWAS, HO/RVI/2/24, 
House Committee Minutes 1
st
 April 1869). Two governors did likewise in 1880 (NUL, 
Hospital Archives, 72, 1880 Annual Report, p. 6). The consistent support of the hospital’s 
benefactors over many years gave the House Committee the confidence to invest in projects 
that were expected to provide the best results in terms of improving patient recovery, even if 
they were not the cheapest options available. One can see this in the efforts of the Infirmary 
to eradicate infections contracted in hospital, specifically pyaemia (septicaemia, blood-
poisoning) and erysipelas (a bacterial skin infection). These were the hospital’s major killers 
for most of the period examined. Florence Nightingale believed the problem lay in noxious 
matter becoming embedded in the wards. Therefore, non-absorbent floors, walls and ceilings 
would be an effective preventative (NUL, Hospital Archives, 72, 1861 Annual Report, pp. 
10-11). Floors, for instance, should be constructed of highly varnished and polished 
hardwood. At the same time, antiseptics were being put forward as an alternative solution 
following the discoveries of Lister and Pasteur. The result was that both systems were 
adopted at Newcastle in order to maximise the chances of success, together with other 
general improvements in sanitation, hygiene and ventilation. The primacy of effectiveness 
over cost is evident in the comment in the 1866 Annual Report that if only “the importance of 
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keeping a dry floor” been “recognised as it is at present, nothing but [the more expensive] 
oak or teak would have been used” in the first place (NUL, Hospital Archives, 72, 1866 
Annual Report, p.6). 
Two capital additions in the period, the Dobson Wing (1855) and the Ravensworth 
Wards (1885), a temporary wooden building erected as a stop-gap measure for housing more 
patients, highlight the relatively minor contribution of accounting to investment decisions, 
and in particular the lack of ex ante information produced. Both of these capital outlays 




The original decision to address the growing problem of overcrowding with the 
addition of the Dobson Wing was taken at the Anniversary Meeting held on 3
rd
 April 1851 
(TWAS, HO/RVI/2/20). No estimates were given at this point in time of the construction 
costs or the additional annual costs that would arise as a result of the increased number of 
inpatients. It was agreed that the burden of construction should not be allowed to fall on the 
existing finances and that additional funds would need to be raised.  
A Building Committee was established and charged with the responsibility of visiting 
other regional hospitals to ascertain good practice and to work with the architect, Mr John 
Dobson, in drawing up plans. The House Committee agreed the plans at a meeting on the 12
th
 
February 1852 with estimated costs in the region of £5,730. The works went out to tender and 
the quotes were laid before the House Committee on the 6
th
 May 1852 (TWAS, 
HO/RVI/2/20). Three quotes were obtained for the complete works ranging from just under 
£5,812 to £6,617. To put these costs into perspective, the total annual subscriptions received 
as reported in the 1851 Annual Report were just over £1,905. It was decided to opt for the 
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lowest quote, and Messrs Gibson and Stewart were awarded the contract. The building work 
commenced in 1852 and during the period of construction various additions and alterations 
were made to the original plan giving a net overall increase to the total cost. In the end, the 
actual anticipated building costs were expected to be nearly £7,000; £1,200 or approximately 
20% over the winning tender price, but the actual final cost was £10,554, almost double the 
original estimate. The House Committee requested a further report from the Building 
Committee in 1855 to examine the overspend, which opined: 
 
In carrying out this undertaking the building committee have not allowed the mere 
consideration of expense to prevent the execution of any work of undoubted utility, 
although they have exercised utmost vigilance in seeing that works were constructed 
with economy [emphasis added] (TWAS, HO/RVI/66/5-6). 
 
 
As was the case with food and other provisions, the initial control of costs took place 
through the well-established tendering process. The decision to invest had already been taken 
before the House Committee received the estimate of £5,730 from the Building Committee. It 
functioned as a benchmark for evaluating the three tenders received. The dual objectives of 
the whole exercise were to obtain the best value for money and to determine how much 
finance the hospital would need to raise, not to decide whether the project should go ahead. In 
similar vein, it must have been clear from the outset that the additional capacity would 
increase the on-going operating costs of the infirmary, but we only find mention of this in 
subsequent annual reports, suggesting it was not considered critical to the decision of whether 
to go ahead. The following reference from the 1853 Annual Report, nearly two years after the 
decision had been taken to build the new wing, is an example: 
 
…70 additional beds capable of containing an annual increase of about 700 patients, 
the cost of whose maintenance cannot well be estimated at less than £1,200 or £1,400 
a year (NUL, Hospital Archives 72). 
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Similarly, the 1854 Annual Report referred to the current level of annual 
subscriptions not being “equal to what they should be if the Institution is to make use of 50 
beds in the new wing” (NUL, Hospital Archives, 72). 
It follows that the hospital management took the decision to build the new wing 
irrespective of the scale of capital required or running costs. So confident were they that the 
hospital’s benefactors would find the extra money needed, the only relevant considerations 
were how to maintain and improve the hospital’s services; and how to ensure good value for 
money. This is reflected in the lack of ex ante cost projections. However, once the decision 
had been taken to build the wing, efforts were made to keep costs to a minimum, 
notwithstanding the significant overrun. A host of information was produced including 
detailed tenders, architect’s plans, reports of visits to other institutions, and comparisons in 
the annual reports between the resultant increase in operating costs and the current state of 
annual subscriptions. Apart from the need to control costs, this information was intended to 
encourage additional subscriptions and donations; and it is noteworthy that the reports of the 
hospital’s various building and special committees were published and therefore freely 
available alongside the annual reports.    
 
Ravensworth Wards 
The building of the Ravensworth Wards 30 years later followed a similar pattern. 
Subsequent to the opening of the Dobson Wing in 1855 and the increased the capacity that it 
provided, the growth in population, advances in medical practices and surgical techniques in 
the 1860’s and 1870’s resulted in the Infirmary once again facing the problem of 
overcrowding. Thus, the decision was taken in 1885 to build a new and enlarged hospital. 
This was another example where financial considerations were subordinated to patient needs. 
A Special Committee, comprising the House Committee and medical staff, was established in 
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1884 to consider how to alleviate the hospital’s acute shortage of space. A serious 
consideration of the costs involved was absent from the discussion, and in the end the 
Committee decided on the most expensive course possible. This was to commit to building a 
new hospital in “a more salubrious locality”, but in the meantime to construct a new 
temporary wing in the hospital garden that became known as the Ravensworth Wards. It is 
significant that the 1884 Annual Report was only able to cost the new temporary building “at 
about” £2,000, whereas no figure could be placed on the new hospital, merely that it would 
be “an expense of many thousands of pounds” (NUL, Hospital Archives 72). In other words, 
so confident were the Special Committee in the generosity and loyalty of the hospital’s 
benefactors to commit significant resources, that the decision to build these new facilities was 
taken without an accurate idea about the costs involved. For example, no information was 
produced that would indicate the on-going costs created by the construction of a new 
hospital, and importantly whether the management would be able to bring in the increased 
income necessary for it to survive. 
The Ravesworth Wards increased the capacity of the Infirmary to 270 beds following 
their opening in October 1885. The 1885 Annual Report states that the total cost, including 
architect’s fees, amounted to £2,260.11s 8d. It was noted that all but £50 had already been 
raised by special subscriptions, which demonstrated the generosity of the subscribers in 
raising the money so quickly for what was a temporary structure.
4
 Like the Dobson Wing 
before, there was a clear overspend of more than 10% compared to the initial estimate. Yet, 
there is no mention in the House Committee minutes of the reasons for this or investigation 
into its causes, just as there is no record as to how the original estimate of £2,000 had been 
                                                 
4
 As generous as the contributions were for the new buildings during our period to 1888, these paled into 
insignificance compared to the sums required to construct the new hospital that was finally built in 1906 at a 
total cost of £203,527. Of this amount, £100,000 was paid for by the Armstrong family, the other £100,000 by 
John Hall, a local ship-owner (McCord, 1979, p.175). 
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arrived at. Once again, amidst the very considerable, detailed, and comprehensive documents 
that the Infirmary took great pains to preserve, there were no published or minuted estimates 
of the increased on-going costs that would result as a consequence of the decision to build the 
new wing. Apart from the initial rough estimate of £2,000, all cost information was produced 
ex post. 
The lack of detailed estimates and projections was mitigated in part by the dialogue 
subsisting between the voluntary hospitals that could effectively turn ex post information 
from one institution into ex ante information for another. There is sufficient evidence to 
suggest that good practice was shared between voluntary hospitals at this time, as was the 
case when the Building Committee was sent to look at best practice in similar institutions 
ahead of the construction of the Dobson Wing. This sharing of information had costing 
implications. For example, in the 1864 Annual Report the House Surgeon comments on the 
Turkish Bath recently installed: 
 
The bath is in operation three days per week and the economy attending its working 
will favour its adoption in similar institutions, where the chief aim is to realise the 




An excellent example of how the Infirmary used ex post information from another 
institution to inform a decision ex ante, this time relating to the hospital’s funding 
arrangements, can be found at the very end of the period under review. In 1887 the report of 
the Special Committee to investigate the past management and financial position of the 
Infirmary recommended that the letter system be abandoned and the Infirmary become a free 
institution, as had been the case at the Sunderland Infirmary since 1877. The report noted that 
Sunderland Infirmary had “not been in debt since the free system had been introduced 
because the workman’s payments far more counterbalanced any loss in subscriptions”. The 
report noted that ordinary workman could not afford to become a subscriber, but could and 
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would be willing to pay smaller regular sums. In over 200 works the workman of Sunderland 
had adopted “a penny per week plan”, which in total far exceeded the annual subscriptions 
from the companies themselves. Hence, the Committee recommended the Sunderland system 
be adopted at Newcastle. This was agreed at the quarterly court in March 1887, and a year 
later the 1888 Annual Report stated: 
 
In making the hospital free it was thought that it would command, to a greater extent 
than before, the support of the working class. This expectation has been realised, the 
sums sent in from the factories of the district exceeding by nearly a thousand pounds 
the amount subscribed by them in the previous year (NUL, Hospital Archives, 72). 
 
An interesting direction for further research would be to ascertain the extent to which 
the free flow of information between these not-for-profit organisations was replicated in the 
commercial sector in Newcastle and surrounding regions at this time, particularly considering 
that many governors of the Newcastle Infirmary were themselves businessmen.  
  
Conclusion 
This study has examined the nature and function of cost accounting within the 
Newcastle Infirmary, a not-for-profit organisation, in the latter half of the 19
th
 century. Based 
on evidence from the vast store of books and records that have been carefully preserved by 
the Infirmary, the study found that the costing arrangements were more about creating the 
right appearance, demonstrating able stewardship, and less about forward-planning and 
decision-making. The hospital relied on voluntary contributions for its maintenance and 
expansion, and management needed to be able to demonstrate that they had utilised those 
moneys effectively in order for that support to continue. Partly this was achieved through 
tracking costs and taking reactive decisions to reduce expenditure wherever possible. Putting 
contracts out to tender provided an alternative non-accounting means of cost control.  
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It was not just about the reality of the situation but the appearance also, and the 
various key-performance ratios in the annual reports, such as cost per patient or average 
length of stay should be interpreted in this light alongside the copious ex post rationalisation 
of costs appearing in the narrative sections of the reports. In order to persuade the public to 
fund the development of the hospital it was necessary to demonstrate that costs were being 
managed efficiently. In particular it was necessary to show that the governors and those 
whom they appointed to manage the hospital were worthy of people’s trust (see for example 
the 100
th
 Annual Report in 1851, NUL, Hospital Archives, 72). Accordingly, a well-
developed system of costing played a critical role in attracting financial support from the 
subscribers and other benefactors. 
The relatively minor role of costing in decision-making within the organisation is 
highlighted by its capital investment decisions where detailed ex ante projections are 
conspicuous by their absence. The review of the capital projects undertaken at the time 
revealed once again the use of accounting information ex post as a means of fully detailing 
the expenditure that had been incurred and to explain why the expenditure was necessary. 
Costing played little role in the actual decisions, although this was mitigated to a degree by 
the willingness of voluntary hospitals to share information about the costs of similar projects 
they themselves had undertaken. Wherever possible the governors of the Newcastle Infirmary 
were keen to fund capital expenditure out of separate fund-raising initiatives. In this regard 
they were successful and all the major capital additions in the period were funded in this way. 
One aspect the governors did not examine, publicly at least, was the consequence of a 
particular addition for the on-going costs of the Infirmary until after the decision to invest had 
been taken. No ex ante information was found to this effect although the costing systems in 
place and the annual figures produced would have made this easy to construct. Given that the 
governors mostly had business backgrounds, this absence seems particularly surprising.  
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These findings stand in marked contrast to the raft of studies relating to the British 
industrial revolution that found costing playing a significant role in decision-making. The 
crucial difference between the Newcastle Infirmary and these industrial undertakings, 
however, is that the hospital effectively had access to whatever finance it needed for its 
development. Moreover it was cost free. Funds were provided by the local community: the 
individual subscribers, company subscribers, trade unions, local authority, church 
congregations and major philanthropists. The proviso was that management first needed to be 
able to demonstrate a) the existence of pressing medical need; and b) that the moneys donated 
were being used efficiently. The overriding objective, however, of the Infirmary, the healing 
of the sick, was both supported by and took precedent over secondary objectives such as cost 
minimisation and control. The primacy of medical need over the cost of providing it is 
evident from the narrative sections of the annual reports. Given that the annual reports were 
the main mechanism by which the hospital management were held accountable, it is 
reasonable to assume that the hospital’s financial supporters shared those priorities.  
Why the benefactors took such an apparently altruistic stance is open to debate. Partly 
it was a reflection the wealth of the region at this time, which marked the heyday of 
Newcastle’s industrial expansion. It was also in the interests of the employers to have an 
effective system for restoring their workers to health. Treating the “indigent” or deserving 
poor was after all the hospital’s express purpose according to its constitution, notwithstanding 
that the distinction between which poor were “deserving” or “undeserving” collapsed in 
practice (Holden et al 2009). Another factor is the moral dimension especially considering 
that the Infirmary was a Christian foundation. With a growing population, heavy industry and 
medical advances all making it increasingly difficult for the Infirmary to fulfil its healing 
mission, committing to these capital projects was the only moral option available. Therefore, 
in order to be accountable to the public they effectively served, the governors not only had to 
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be economically accountable but morally accountable also. As a Christian institution, they 
could not and did not defer improvements that would bring benefits, and it is noteworthy that 
church collections constituted a regular and dependable source of funds to the hospital 
throughout the period. Finally, there is the question of civic pride and the town’s 
redevelopment. The 19
th
 century was the period when Newcastle was completely remodelled 
with the building of the “New Town” and other monumental rail and civic architecture. The 
inspiration for Newcastle’s new Classical facade came from two directions: the New Town in 
Edinburgh and John Nash’s work in London for the Prince Regent (Faulkner, 2001). The 
redevelopment of the town was not just an indicator of the wealth of the region, but of the 
aspiration of its middle-classes that Newcastle should be regarded as the equal of, if not better 
than its peers; and their willingness to fund the development of the Infirmary reflected this 
civic vision. The sense of moral mission combined with one of civic pride is echoed by the 
following quote from the 1878 annual report: 
 
Whilst no efforts should be spared to make it [the Infirmary] more useful, they [the 
governors] regard it as it now is, an institution of priceless value to suffering 
humanity, a grand outcome of that benevolence which Christianity inspires, and a 
honour to the town and the North of England (NUL, Hospital Archives 72). 
 
 
The financial support of the Infirmary proffered by the local middle-classes suggests 
these sentiments went beyond rhetoric. 
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Figure 2.  Table showing the average cost per patient from the 1854 Annual Report 
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Figure 3. Table showing the average annual receipts from the 1854 Annual Report 
 
 
